with an order of the federal district court is an appeal. Once such an order becomes final the Federal Government must have authority to protect persons acting pursuant to the order from outside interference. This protective power has long been recognized and must exist if federal law is to be made effective, if private individuals are not to be permitted to make a mockery of federal courts.

In concluding my presentation of the reasons why we urge the Congress to provide the Government with civil remedies in civil rights cases, I should like to make three general observations. First, we are not asking for new and untried powers. The use of civil remedies as a means of enforcing federal rights is not uncommon and exists in a number of areas. For over 60 years, as a matter of fact, the Department of Justice itself has had experience in the coordinated use of civil and criminal remedies in the anti-trust field. Ever since its adoption the Sherman Act has provided that the district courts should have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of the criminal sections of the act and has made it the duty of the Department of Justice to "institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations." Much of the success of the Department in antitrust work is directly attributable to the availability of civil remedies since here, as in the civil rights cases, criminal prosecution of violators sometimes is unduly harsh and too restrictive.

Second, these proposals would not extend or increase the area of civil rights jurisdiction in which the Federal Government is entitled to act. These rights are now protected by amendments to the Constitution, and when they are violated the Government may act already under the criminal law. Enactment of our proposals would add civil remedies which would not enlarge or in any way clash, as we see it, with the constitutional limitations on Federal Government action in this field. Rather it would permit us to take civil remedial action